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Segmentation is a core strategy in modern marketing and age-speci￿c
segmentation, which is based on the age of the consumers, is very common
in practice. A characteristic of age-speci￿c segmentation is the change
of the segments composition during time, which may be studied only
using dynamic advertising models. Here, we assume that a ￿rm wants
to promote and sell a single product in an age segmented market and we
model the awareness of this product using an in￿nite dimensional Nerlove-
Arrow goodwill as a state variable. Assuming an in￿nite time horizon, we
use some dynamic programming techniques to solve the problem and to
characterize both the optimal advertising e⁄ort and the optimal goodwill
path in the long run. An interesting feature of the optimal advertising
e⁄ort is an anticipation e⁄ect with respect to the segments considered in
the target market due to the time evolution of the segmentation.
Keywords: dynamic programming, advertising, vintage capital.
JEL Classifcation Numbers: E22, M37, C61, C62.
1 Introduction
Segmentation is a core strategy in modern marketing which, coupled with dy-
namic advertising models, represents an interesting area of research where dif-
ferent disciplines can interact. Market segmentation is the result of partitioning
1the whole market into distinct consumer groups, each characterized by special
sets of attribute values, so that its members will exhibit the same needs and
behaviors [1, p.379]. The introduction of segmentation in a dynamic advertis-
ing model allows to analyze some phenomena which cannot be studied from a
static point of view. For example, segmentation may help the decision maker to
compare di⁄erent advertising media (see [2]), or is useful to analyze advertising
strategies distributed over several geographic regions (see [3] and [4]).
In this paper we focus on the demographic segmentation based on consumers￿
age. Age segmentation is very common in practice, because data may be simply
organized according to age of consumers and because some products are spon-
taneously age-speci￿c. A characteristic of age-speci￿c segmentation, which can
be studied only in a dynamic framework, is the change of the segments composi-
tion during time. For example, the advertising e⁄ort addressed to the ￿16 years
segment￿will be found in the ￿18 years segment￿after 2 years. This phenom-
enon requires models of investment with vintage capital [5] and the idea that
advertising may fall within this area has already been presented in [6]. In that
paper the authors assume that a ￿rm sells a continuum of goods: new goods are
continuously launched by the ￿rm onto the market and therefore these goods are
di⁄erentiated by their vintage. Our approach is di⁄erent: as in [7] we assume
that the ￿rm sells a single product, and the sales of this good in segment a at
the time t depend on the goodwill level for this product in segment a at the
time t. Even if, from a mathematical point of view, the model is similar to the
one described in [6], the economic interpretation in term of marketing variables
is de￿nitely di⁄erent.
The aim of this paper is to study the deep connections between the age-
speci￿c segmentation and the equilibrium points in the long run. The paper is
organized as follows: in section 2 we described the model and we introduce the
characteristic functions of an age-speci￿c segmentation. In section 3 we solve
the abstract problem using some Dynamic Programming techniques in in￿nite
dimension and we present an explicit solution for the linear quadratic instance
of the model. Finally, in section 4 we show how to apply our results in some real
situations and we present some numerical simulations which explicitly show the
anticipation e⁄ect for the advertising e⁄ort with respect to the segments in the
target market.
2 The Model
We assume a ￿rm sells a good in a segmented market and wants to organize an
advertising campaign to support this good. The market is segmented using age
as a demographic variable, which is assumed continuous with values in [0;!].
As a state variable we use the Nerlove-Arrow goodwill, which summarizes the
past investment in advertising. In order to describe the market segmentation
we introduce the state variable G(t;a), that represents the goodwill value at
time t 2 [0;+1) for the consumers of age a 2 [0;!]. The goodwill evolution is
2described (as in [7]) by means of the following partial di⁄erential equation
@tG(t;a) + @aG(t;a) = ￿￿G(t;a) + u(t;a) (1)
where u(t;a) ￿ 0 is the control variable for the decision maker, and represents
the advertising e⁄ort at time t addressed to the consumer segment of age a. We
assume the boundary conditions
G(t;0) = 0 for all t 2 [0;+1) (2)
and the initial condition
G(0;a) = g (a) ￿ 0 for all a 2 [0;!]; (3)
which mean, respectively, that the goodwill value for the segment of age 0 must
be always zero and the initial goodwill value among di⁄erent segments is given.
Moreover, we assume that the pro￿t ￿ ow is linear in the goodwill for each
age a 2 [0;!] and is described by the following function
t 7! ￿ (a)G(t;a)
where ￿ (a) > 0 represents pro￿t rate of the segment a (except for the advertising





This assumption is quite familiar in dynamic advertising model when closed
form solutions are desired (see e.g. [2] and the references therein).
The de￿nition of advertising costs is complicated by the fact that the costs
to reach a certain segment need be characteristic of such segment. Hence, we are
assuming that the advertising costs are stationary in time, but nonstationary
in age. Thus we assume a general advertising cost function such as
c : [0;!] ￿ [0;+1) ! [0;+1)
(a;u) 7! c(a;u) (4)
where c(a;u) is the cost ￿ ow to reach the segment a with an advertising e⁄ort
u. The function c is assumed to be increasing and possibly (but not necessarily)
convex in the advertising e⁄ort variable u. Under this assumption the total





We notice that often in literature the advertising cost function is assumed
quadratic (see e.g. [8, p. 103]) which corresponds to de￿ning a simple instance





3Summarizing all our assumptions, we may formulate the problem as follows.
A ￿rm wants to organize an advertising campaign (choosing an advertising











@tG(t;a) + @aG(t;a) = ￿￿G(t;a) + u(t;a)
G(t;0) = 0 for all t 2 [0;+1)
G(0;a) = g (a) ￿ 0 for all a 2 [0;!]
If arrested at the short run, the model falls within the family of age-structured
control systems and can be studied using the necessary condition introduced
in [9]. In the long run instead, Dynamic Programming techniques in in￿nite
dimension prove to be e¢ cient in computing optimal couples and equilibrium
points. Such techniques are also promising in the case, which we leave for
future work, in which the pro￿t ￿ ow has a nonlinear dependence on the goodwill
G(t;a).
In order to clarify the more general case of the next section, we brie￿ y recall
the classical linear quadratic instance of this model. If market is not segmented,
then we have a single goodwill G(t) and its evolution is described by an ordinary
di⁄erential equation
_ G(t) = ￿￿G(t) + u(t) (6)
which is the motion equation introduced by Nerlove and Arrow in their seminal














Using the phase-space analysis it is simple to obtain that the optimal advertising
investment uopt is constant
uopt (t) = ￿=￿(￿ + ￿) (8)
and the equilibrium goodwill G1 is
G1 (t) = ￿=￿￿(￿ + ￿) (9)
As we want to take an age segmentation into account we have to modify both
the motion equation (6) and the objective functional (7). In the motion equation
we need to consider time evolution of segments and the possibility of reaching
reach di⁄erent segments with di⁄erent advertising e⁄orts, we leads to a partial
di⁄erential equation (1). In the objective functional we need to consider that
4both revenues and advertising costs are segment-speci￿c, hence the pro￿t is
described by (5). Finally, we remark that an equilibrium point as (9) becomes,
in an age-structured setting, an equilibrium function of the variable a, which
describes segmentation in the long run. One of the aims of this paper is to
provide existence of such equilibrium function and study its dependence on the
functions ￿ (a) and c(a;u) that describe the segmentation.
3 Dynamic Programming in in￿nite dimension
One of the aim of this paper is to show how in￿nite dimensional techniques may
be powerful and e¢ cient to compute optimal couples and equilibrium points.
The technique consists in rephrasing the original control problem for the par-
tial di⁄erential equation (1) as a problem for a suitable ordinary di⁄erential
equation, but in an in￿nite dimensional setting. The reader is adviced that the
unconstrained problem is studied ￿rst, while later in subsection ?? we show how
the problem with positivity constraints on the control may be obtained as an
equivalent unconstrained problem with modi￿ed cost functions.
First of all we consider the space of square integrable functions of variable
a as the state space of the control problem, that is







; and hf;gi denotes the scalar product of f and
g in L2(0;!): Then the state variable G(t) is that function of L2(0;!) such that
G(t)(a) = G(t;a). Similarly one chooses L2(0;!) as the control space, and u(t)
as the control, where u(t) is that function of L2(0;!) such that u(t)(a) = u(t;a).
Hence, if f0 denotes the distributional derivative of f; we set
H1(0;!) =
￿
f 2 L2(0;!) : f0 2 L2(0;!)
￿
and introduce the di⁄erential operator A with domain D(A) = ff 2 H1(0;!) :
f(0) = 0g such that
A : D(A) ￿ L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); Af(a) = ￿f0(a) ￿ ￿f(a);
so that the original evolution system given by (1), (2), (3) becomes a control
system for an ordinary di⁄erential equation in the Hilbert space L2(0;!) :
(
_ G(t) = AG(t) + u(t) t > 0
G(0) = g 2 L2(0;!)
(10)
The boundary condition is enclosed into the de￿nition of the domain D(A) of
the operator A: The control operator is the identity function on L2(0;!):
The technique is very well known and may be found in classical books on
evolution equations such as [10] or the more recent [11]. In [10], [11] one ￿nds





[etAf](a) = e￿￿tf(a ￿ t)￿[t;!](a); (11)
for all f 2 L2(0;!), a 2 [0;!]. Then by means of variation of constants formula
the trajectory is given by the following function in L2(0;!)




By means of (11), the preceding formula can be explicited as
G(t;a) = e￿￿tg(a ￿ t)￿[t;!](a) +
Z minft;ag
0
e￿￿su(t ￿ s;a ￿ s)ds: (13)
Regarding the objective functional, we assume that the marginal pro￿t function
￿ is in the space L2(0;!), so that the running revenue R can be described using
the scalar product:
R : L2(0;!) ! R G 7! R(G) =
Z !
0
￿ (a)G(a)da = h￿;Gi (14)
while the running advertising investment cost is








e￿￿t [h￿;G(t)i ￿ C(u(t))] dt (15)
We notice that this functional is concave in the control-state variables. More-
over, it is structurally similar to (7) but the functions R(G(t)) and C(u(t)) hide
data aggregated with respect to the a variable. The control problem is that of

















Using this notation we de￿ne the value function of the optimal control problem
in the usual way:
V (g) = sup
u2U
J[g;u]:
63.1 Discounted demand in abstract terms
Next we list some properties of A￿, the adjoint operator of A, that prove useful
in the sequel.
Lemma 1 If A￿ is the adjoint of A, namely
A￿ : D(A￿) ￿ L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); A￿f(a) = f0(a) ￿ ￿f(a);
with D(A￿) = ff 2 H1(0;!) : f(!) = 0g, then etA
￿
is the adjoint of etA, with
[etA
￿
f](a) = e￿￿tf(a + t)￿[0;!￿t](a):
Moreover for all ￿ > ￿￿ the operator ￿I ￿ A￿ is invertible with continuous
inverse









For the proof of this Lemma and for all details on the semigroup and its






and note that this function represents the discounted demand associated to one
unit of goodwill of the segment a. Indeed the segment of age a becomes of age
￿ after a time ￿ ￿ a, hence the discounted demand of the segment a, which
becomes of age ￿ after a time ￿ ￿ a, is
e￿￿(￿￿a)￿(￿):
In the meantime the unit of goodwill is exponentially decreased and amounts to
e￿￿(￿￿a). Therefore the discounted demand of a unit of goodwill of the segment
a for being of age ￿ after a time ￿ ￿ a is the integrand in (18)
e￿(￿+￿)(￿￿a)￿(￿)
It is easy to show that if ￿ is in L2(0;!), then ￿ ￿ has a derivative in the sense of
distributions and that ￿ ￿0 is also in L2(0;!).
Moreover, the previous lemma yields
￿ ￿(a) = [(￿I ￿ A￿)￿1￿](a):
73.2 Optimal strategies and trajectories
We assume the following hypotheses:
(H1) ￿ 2 L2(0;!);
(H2) C : L2(0;!) ! R [ f+1g, C measurable and such that
A = argmax
￿
h￿;ui ￿ C(u) : u 2 L2(0;!)
￿
6= ;:
Remark 2 Assumption (H2) may be explicited in a number on interesting
cases. For instance, assume











the Legendre transform of C, and with @C￿ the subgradient of the convex func-
tion C￿, then (H3) implies (H2), as
A = @C￿(￿ ￿)
Indeed, the function u 7! h￿;ui ￿ C(u) has a maximum at u if and only if
￿ ￿ @C(u) 3 0 and, by the well known property of convex conjugate functions,
￿ ￿ @C(u) 3 0 , ￿ 2 @C(u) , u 2 @C￿(￿):
Then we come to the main result of this subsection, describing optimal
controls and the value function of the control problem. Due to the linearity
of the revenue with respect to the goodwill (see (14)), the objective functional
may be written separating the dependence on u and g. As a consequence, the
optimal control and the value function may be computed explicitly.
Theorem 3 Assume that (H1) and (H2) hold, then the pro￿t functional may
be written as
J [g;u] = h￿;gi +
Z +1
0
e￿￿t [h￿;u(t)i ￿ C(u(t))]dt:
Moreover, any optimal control uopt does not depend on t and satis￿es
uopt(t) ￿ uopt 2 A
consequently the optimal value function can be written as,
V (g) = h￿;gi +
h￿;uopti ￿ C(uopt)
￿
8In particular, it is an a¢ ne function of g, so that V is FrØchet-di⁄erentiable,
with gradient
rV (g) = ￿ 2 L2(0;!):
Proof . Even if the proof is similar to that given by Barucci and Gozzi
in [12], for the reader￿ s convenience we sketch it under our assumptions. The
objective functional can be rewritten as
Z +1
0






























































































and the ￿rst formula is proven. Now, we observe that
supu2U
R +1
0 e￿￿t [h￿;u(t)i ￿ C(u(t))]dt ￿
￿
R +1




where the supremum in the last formula is attained at any u 2 A. As all
time-constant controls are admissible, the inequality in (19) is an equality. ￿
Corollary 4 Assume that (H1) and (H3) hold, then:
uopt(t) ￿ uopt 2 @C￿(￿ ￿)
consequently the optimal value function can be written as,




9Proof. It is contained in Remark 2.
Remark 5 If (H3) holds and moreover C￿ is di⁄erentiable, than @C￿(￿) is
singleton and contains only the FrØchet-di⁄erential rC￿(￿); hence the optimal
control is unique, it is independent of time t, and it is given by the following
formula
uopt(t) ￿ uopt = rC￿(￿)
3.3 Equilibrium points
For the sake of simplicity we now assume that (H3) holds and that C￿ :
L2(0;!) ! R is ￿nite and di⁄erentiable. Then the optimal feedback map is
a constant map ’ : L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); ￿ 7! rC￿(￿) so that the closed loop
equation is
_ G(t) = AG(t) + rC￿(￿) (20)
We de￿ne an equilibrium point for the system as any stationary solution of
the closed loop equation (20), that is, a solution G1 in L2(0;!) to the equation
AG1 + rC￿(￿) = 0: (21)
Theorem 6 Assume (H1) (H3) hold, and moreover that C￿ : L2(0;!) ! R
is ￿nite and di⁄erentiable. Then the unique equilibrium point for the problem




e￿￿s [rC￿(￿)](a ￿ s)ds




Proof of Theorem 6 Since the operator A has a continuous inverse A￿1 :
L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); de￿ned by A￿1f(a) = ￿
R a
0 e￿￿sf(a ￿ s)ds; the equation
(21) may be written also as
G1 = ￿A￿1rC￿(￿)
yielding the desired formula for the unique equilibrium point. The stability of
equilibrium is a classical result and depends on the dissipativity of the di⁄eren-
tial operator A. ￿
103.4 Problems with constraints
We now add a constraint on the control
u(t;a) 2 [M1;M2]; for almost all t > 0 and for almost all a in [0;!]: (22)
and show that we may reformulate the constrained problem as an unconstrained
















h￿;u(t)i ￿ b C(u(t))
i
dt: (23)
It may be easily shown that the problem of maximizing J[g;u] given by (15)
over
Uc = fu 2 U : (22) is satis￿edg;
subject to (12) is equivalent to the unconstrained problem of maximizing b J [g;u]







Indeed, although the supremum of b J is computed on the whole class U, a control
violating the constraint cannot be optimal, and is not taken into account in the
maximization process.
Theorem 7 Assume (H1) and that (H2) is satis￿ed with b C in place of C. Set
also
A(a) := Argmaxf￿(a)w ￿ c(a;w) : w 2 [M1;M2]g
and assume that such set is nonempty for a.a. a 2 [0;!]: A control uopt is
optimal if and only uopt(t;a) ￿ uopt(a); for a.a. a 2 [0;!]; where uopt(a) 2
A(a) de￿nes a function in L2(0;!): Consequently,









Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Theorem 3.￿
Remark. If c is a l.s.c. function, convex in the variable u, then
￿(a)uopt(a) ￿ c(a;uopt(a)) = [b c(a;￿)]
￿ (￿(a))
11where c￿ is the Legendre transform of c
[b c(a;￿)]

















since the latter sup is constantly ￿1: Consequently







3.5 Some useful examples
3.5.1 Pure quadratic costs
In order to make the analysis presented in the previous Section more e⁄ective,
we assume here that the advertising costs are quadratic:











where ￿ 2 L1(0;!); 0 < " ￿ ￿(a) ￿ ￿; and where B￿ is the moltiplication
operator B￿ : L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); u(￿) 7! ￿(￿)u(￿):
First of all we notice that (H4) implies (H2) and (H3), hence we can apply
















so that C￿ is di⁄erentiable with rC￿ (￿ ￿) = B 1
￿ ￿ ￿:: Hence, there exists a unique










with associated optimal trajectory is given by






The value function of the problem is then





￿(￿ ￿); ￿ ￿
E
:
12Moreover, using the results contained in Theorem 6 we can show that there








and such equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is
lim
t!+1Gopt(t;a) = G1(a); 8a 2 [0;!]:
We notice that in (24) the positivity constraint is satis￿ed, hence the solution
of the constrained problem coincides with that of the unconstrained problem.
3.5.2 Linear quadratic with positivity constraints
We now assume the data satisfy (H1) and













￿ ￿ 2 L2(0;!);
￿ k 2 L1(0;!); " ￿ k(a) ￿ k;
￿ Bk the moltiplication operator Bk : L2(0;!) ! L2(0;!); u(￿) 7!
￿(￿)u(￿):
(H6) u(t;a) ￿ 0; for a.a. (t;a) 2 [0;+1) ￿ [0;!]
Again, (H5) implies (H3) and (H2). Moreover throough (H6) we require a
positivity constraint on the control.









The associated optimal trajectory is given by
Gopt
































￿ (￿(a)) = sup
w￿0
￿















and the maximum is attained in uopt(a) described by (27). The remaining
assertions are straightforward.
4 Applications
4.1 Pure quadratic costs
First of all we consider only pure quadratic costs so that the simpler setting






and we do not have to force the positive constraint because the advertising e⁄ort
de￿ned by (30) is already positive. The optimal advertising e⁄ort described in
(30) is well known and it represents an application of the golden rule: ￿mar-
ginal revenues equal to marginal costs￿(see [2], formula (2.4)). However, it is
interesting to notice how marginal revenues are computed in (30). The function
￿ is de￿ned in (18) and represents the marginal revenue given by each segment.
It is interesting to notice that ￿ (a) may be strictly positive even if ￿ (a) = 0.
This phenomenon is not present in [2, formula 2.4] where the marginal revenue
given by the segments out of the support of the function ￿ is always zero. This
di⁄erence is connected with the time evolution of the segmentation: it is prof-
itable to invest in a segment a even if ￿ (a) = 0 when this segment will enter
in the support of the function ￿ in the future. In this model advertising e⁄orts
anticipate the time evolution and invest also in the segments which will be later
on the support of the function ￿. In order to clarify this situation we present
two simple examples. As the novelty in this model is represented by the function
(18), we focus on this function and the associated function ￿ and we assume
that ￿(a) ￿ ￿ ￿.
144.1.1 Target market [￿;!]
Let the target market be [￿;!] with ￿ 2 (0;!), so that the ￿rm sells its product
only to people of age grater than ￿. For instance, a car is a product of this type,
as it can be sold only to people who are aged above the minimum to posses a
driver￿ s licence. If we assume that the marginal revenues for all the segments
in the target market are the same, we can write, after rescaling the objecting
functional,




























We observe that this function can be seen as a product between the constant
1=￿ ￿(￿+￿) (which is the same constant we have found in (8)) and a function de-
pending on a which describes the revenue associated to each segment. Moreover,
we notice that even if [0;￿) is not in the target market, the advertising ￿ ow di-
rected to these segments is not equal to zero. Then it is optimal to anticipate the
time evolution of the segmentation. In the following simulation the parameters
are chosen as follows: ￿ = 18;! = 70;￿ = 0:1;￿ = 0:01; ￿ ￿ = 1;g (a) ￿ 0.
As well illustrated in these pictures, we can prove that uopt (t;a) has a max-
imum at a = ￿ (for all choice of the parameters). Moreover, using (26) we may
compute explicitly G￿
1 (a) and prove that this function is increasing and convex
in [0;￿]; and decreasing in [￿;!] (for any choice of the parameters).
4.1.2 Target market [￿;￿]
In this second example we consider a di⁄erent target market. To ￿x ideas we
think of a ￿rm which wants to sell a sports car such as a coupØ. As in the
15previous example, the target market for this product is bounded from below by
the driver￿ s licence age, and also from above: generally a family man prefers a
width car instead of a coupØ. Hence, assuming again that the marginal revenues
for all the segments in the target market are the same, we can write, after
rescaling the objective functional,
￿(a) = ￿[￿;￿] (a)









e￿(￿+￿)￿ ￿ e￿(￿+￿)￿￿ 1





e￿(￿+￿)a ￿ e￿(￿+￿)￿￿ 1
(￿+￿) ￿ ￿ a ￿ ￿
0 a > ￿














￿ ￿ a ￿ ￿
0 a > ￿
Here the anticipation e⁄ect of the advertising e⁄ort is less relevant (i.e. for
a < ￿ the advertising e⁄ort in the ￿rst example is always greater that the
advertising e⁄ort obtained here). In this example an investment in the segments
[0;￿) is less pro￿table because when these segments overrun the threshold ￿
their demand vanishes. For the same reason the advertising e⁄ort direct to the
segment (￿;!] is always zero. In the following simulation the parameters are
chosen as follows: ￿ = 18;￿ = 40;! = 70;￿ = 0:1;￿ = 0:01; ￿ ￿ = 1;g (a) ￿ 0.
4.2 Linear quadratic costs
If (H5) holds, then the optimal advertising e⁄ort is
u￿(t;a) ￿
￿




16Now we assume that ￿(a) = ￿ ￿, while we de￿ned the function ￿ (a) as follows
￿ (a) = ￿ ￿ (a + a1)(a2 ￿ a) (32)
where a1 ￿ 0, a2 ￿ !, while ￿ ￿ > 0. It is easy to understand the e⁄ect of this
new term if we consider these two pictures:
In the picture on the left we have the pure quadratic advertising cost function
c(a;u) = 0:5u2, while in the picture on the right we have the linear quadratic
advertising cost function c(a;u) = 0:5u2 + 0:004(a + 5)(85 ￿ a)u. The linear
term produces an extra cost which decreases the optimal advertising e⁄ort.
Using the parameters a1;a2 we can model this extra term so that it becomes
age dependent. In the formulation (32) the linear term has a maximum for
a = (a2 ￿ a1)=2 and by the de￿nition of a1 and a2 we can model the position
of this maximum.
Now it is interesting to consider how this linear term modi￿es the optimal
advertising strategies we have found in the previous examples.
4.2.1 Target market [￿;!]
If (H5) holds with ￿(a) ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ (a) = ￿ ￿ (a + a1)(a2 ￿ a), and ￿(a) = ￿[￿;!] (a)












1 ￿ e￿(￿+￿)(!￿a) ￿ ￿ ￿ (a + a1)(a2 ￿ a)
￿+
a > ￿
We repeat the previous simulation with ￿ = 18;! = 70;￿ = 0:1;￿ =
0:01; ￿ ￿ = 1;g (a) ￿ 0, and with the new parameters set as ￿ ￿ = 0:004;a1 =
5;a2 = 85.
17In the picture on the left the dashed line represents the optimal advertising
e⁄ort, while the other line represents the same function without applying the
positive part function. It is interesting to note that the anticipation e⁄ect in
this simulation becomes less evident.
4.2.2 Target market [￿;￿]
If (H5) holds with ￿(a) ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ (a) = ￿ ￿ (a + a1)(a2 ￿ a), and ￿(a) = ￿[￿;￿] (a)














1 ￿ e￿(￿+￿)(￿￿a) ￿ ￿ ￿ (a + a1)(a2 ￿ a)
￿+
￿ ￿ a ￿ ￿
0 a > ￿
We repeat the previous simulation with ￿ = 18;! = 70;￿ = 0:1;￿ =
0:01; ￿ ￿ = 1;g (a) ￿ 0, and with the new parameters set as ￿ ￿ = 0:004;a1 =
5;a2 = 85.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show how Dynamic Programming techniques in in￿nite dimen-
sions may be exploited to study optimal value of goodwill in the long run for an
18age-structured problem of optimal advertising. We can characterize the optimal
goodwill in the long run and we explicitly ￿nd it as an equilibrium point of the
closed loop equation of an abstract control problem.
A topic for further research consists in the optimal activation of an adver-
tising channel. Actually, in the real world, a ￿rm cannot decide the advertising
e⁄ort to direct to each segments. A ￿rm can only activate an advertising chan-
nel which hits with di⁄erent intensities di⁄erent segments. The solution of the
optimal activation problem of an advertising channel in a segmented market
in presented in [2], but there the time evolution of an age segmentation is not
considered. The extension of the results obtained in this paper to the optimal
activation of an advertising channel in an age segmented market seems to be a
promising area for further research.
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